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Executive summary
• For almost 60 years, the WHO Global Influenza
Surveillance and Response System (GISRS) has been the
key player in monitoring the evolution and spread of influ-
enza viruses and recommending the strains to be used in
human influenza vaccines. The GISRS has also worked to
continually monitor and assess the risk posed by potential
pandemic viruses and to guide appropriate public health
responses.
• The expanded and enhanced role of the GISRS follow-
ing the adoption of the International Health Regulations
(2005), recognition of the continuing threat posed by avian
H5N1 and the aftermath of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic
provide an opportune time to critically review the process
by which influenza vaccine viruses are selected. In addition
to identifying potential areas for improvement, such a
review will also help to promote greater appreciation by
the wider influenza and policy-making community of the
complexity of influenza vaccine virus selection.
• The selection process is highly coordinated and involves
continual year-round integration of virological data and
epidemiological information by National Influenza Centres
(NICs), thorough antigenic and genetic characterization of
viruses by WHO Collaborating Centres (WHOCCs) as part
of selecting suitable candidate vaccine viruses, and the
preparation of suitable reassortants and corresponding
reagents for vaccine standardization by WHO Essential
Regulatory Laboratories (ERLs).
• Ensuring the optimal effectiveness of vaccines has been
assisted in recent years by advances in molecular diagnosis
and the availability of more extensive genetic sequence
data. However, there remain a number of challenging
constraints including variations in the assays used, the
possibility of complications resulting from non-antigenic
changes, the limited availability of suitable vaccine viruses
and the requirement for recommendations to be made up
to a year in advance of the peak of influenza season
because of production constraints.
• Effective collaboration and coordination between
human and animal influenza networks is increasingly
recognized as an essential requirement for the improved
integration of data on animal and human viruses, the
identification of unusual influenza A viruses infecting
human, the evaluation of pandemic risk and the selection
of candidate viruses for pandemic vaccines.
• Training workshops, assessments and donations have
led to significant increases in trained laboratory personnel
and equipment with resulting expansion in both geo-
graphical surveillance coverage and in the capacities of
NICs and other laboratories. This has resulted in a sig-
nificant increase in the volume of information reported
to WHO on the spread, intensity and impact of influ-
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Fund Project have facilitated the timely sharing of clini-
cal specimens and virus isolates and contributed to a
more comprehensive understanding of the global distri-
bution and temporal circulation of different viruses. It
will be important to sustain and build upon the gains
made in these and other areas.
• Although the haemagglutination inhibition (HAI) assay
is likely to remain the assay of choice for the antigenic
characterization of viruses in the foreseeable future, alterna-
tive assays – for example based upon advanced recombi-
nant DNA and protein technologies – may be more
adaptable to automation. Other technologies such as
microtitre neuraminidase inhibition assays may also have
significant implications for both vaccine virus selection and
vaccine development.
• Microneutralization assays provide an important
adjunct to the HAI assay in virus antigenic characteriza-
tion. Improvements in the use and potential automation of
such assays should facilitate large-scale serological studies,
while other advanced techniques such as epitope mapping
should allow for a more accurate assessment of the quality
of a protective immune response and aid the development
of additional criteria for measuring immunity.
• Standardized seroepidemiological surveys to assess the
impact of influenza in a population could help to estab-
lish well-characterized banks of age-stratified representa-
tive sera as a national, regional and global resource,
while providing direct evidence of the specific benefits of
vaccination.
• Advances in high-throughput genetic sequencing
coupled with advanced bioinformatics tools, together with
more X-ray crystallographic data, should accelerate
understanding of the genetic and phenotypic changes that
underlie virus evolution and more specifically help to predict
the influence of amino acid changes on virus antigenicity.
• Complex mathematical modelling techniques are
increasingly being used to gain insights into the evolution
and epidemiology of influenza viruses. However, their value
in predicting the timing and nature of future antigenic and
genetic changes is likely to be limited at present. The
application of simpler non-mechanistic statistical
algorithms, such as those already used as the basis of anti-
genic cartography, and phylogenetic modelling are more
likely to be useful in facilitating vaccine virus selection and
in aiding assessment of the pandemic potential of avian
and other animal influenza viruses.
• The adoption of alternative vaccine technologies – such
as live-attenuated, quadrivalent or non-HA-based vaccines
– has significant implications for vaccine virus selection, as
well as for vaccine regulatory and manufacturing processes.
Recent collaboration between the GISRS and vaccine
manufacturers has resulted in the increased availability of
egg isolates and high-growth reassortants for vaccine pro-
duction, the development of qualified cell cultures and the
investigation of alternative methods of vaccine potency
testing. WHO will continue to support these and other
efforts to increase the reliability and timeliness of the global
influenza vaccine supply.
• The WHO GISRS and its partners are continually work-
ing to identify improvements, harness new technologies
and strengthen and sustain collaboration. WHO will
continue in its central role of coordinating worldwide
expertise to meet the increasing public health need for
influenza vaccines and will support efforts to improve the
vaccine virus selection process, including through the
convening of periodic international consultations.
Please cite this paper as: Zhang et al. (2011) Improving influenza vaccine virus selection. Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses DOI: 10.1111/j.1750-
2659.2011.00277.x.
Introduction
The historic initiative to establish a global network to
detect and identify new and potentially dangerous influenza
viruses predates the adoption of the WHO Constitution in
1948. With memories of the 1918–1919 influenza pandemic
still vivid, and the ever-evolving threat posed by influenza
recognized, the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance and
Response System (GISRS) was formally established in
1952. Influenza thus became one of the first diseases to
highlight the importance of international monitoring and
collaboration in protecting human health.
Following the re-emergence of human cases of highly
pathogenic avian H5N1 influenza in 2003 and the adoption
of the International Health Regulations (2005), the GISRS
was strengthened and its role in protecting public health
enhanced. In addition to tracking the course and impact of
annual influenza epidemics and monitoring the evolution of
seasonal influenza viruses, the GISRS also acts as a global
alert mechanism for the emergence of influenza viruses with
the potential to cause a human pandemic. The Network
provides support to both seasonal and pandemic influenza
preparedness and response activities in areas such as diag-
nostics, vaccine development, virological surveillance and
risk assessment. It also acts as the focus of WHO efforts to
 Former WHO Global Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN),
which has been renamed as WHO Global Influenza Surveillance and
Response System (GISRS) since 24 May 2011, when the World Health
Assembly Resolution WHA 64.5 was adopted.
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assist Member States in strengthening their national capac-
ity for the surveillance, diagnosis, characterization and shar-
ing of influenza viruses.
As a key player in global influenza risk assessment and
response, the GISRS continues to evolve and expand, and
as of December 2010 consisted of 135 National Influenza
Centres (NICs) in 105 countries, six WHO Collaborating
Centres (WHOCCs), 11 WHO H5 Reference Laboratories
and four WHO Essential Regulatory Laboratories (ERLs).
The GISRS also works to ensure the successful coordination
of WHO activities with those of external agencies such as
the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network
(GOARN), national regulatory authorities, academic and
veterinary institutes, and the pharmaceutical industry.
The first formal WHO recommendations on influenza
vaccine composition were issued in 1971. Since 1998,
separate and appropriately timed recommendations for the
Northern and Southern Hemispheres have been issued each
year in February and September, respectively. These bian-
nual recommendations are based upon the virological and
epidemiological information generated by the GISRS
and play a crucial role in the development, production and
availability of effective influenza vaccines.
The continuing threat posed by avian H5N1, the
aftermath of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, the increased
knowledge of influenza, and the development and availability
of new technologies provide a timely opportunity to review
the complex processes and issues involved in influenza
vaccine virus selection and to identify potential areas for
improvement. This WHO informal consultation represents
the latest step in an ongoing process of GISRS strengthening
and was convened with the following objectives:
• to review the current vaccine virus selection process,
including its constraints and limitations;
• to identify opportunities for improving influenza surveil-
lance and representative virus sharing;
• to assess the potential for improving the assays and
technologies used for vaccine virus selection; and
• to assess the potential impact of new vaccine technolo-
gies on the vaccine virus selection process.
Participants were drawn from a broad and highly diverse
range of institutes and sectors including the following:
WHOCCs, NICs, WHO ERLs, WHO H5 Reference Labora-
tories, national regulatory authorities, public health agen-
cies, academia, influenza vaccine manufacturers, and
veterinary laboratories and organizations.
The GISRS vaccine virus selection process
The primary goal of the GISRS vaccine virus selection
process (Annex 1) is to generate and analyse the data needed
to recommend the influenza vaccine viruses that will most
closely match the influenza viruses likely to be circulating
during forthcoming influenza seasons. Current vaccine tech-
nologies and production schedules mean that decisions on
vaccine composition have to be made almost a full year in
advance of the peak of seasonal influenza activity. As a result,
the process relies upon the earliest possible detection of
emerging antigenic variants and the most up-to-date infor-
mation on their potential future epidemiological signifi-
cance. Information must therefore be collected year round
on the continuous evolution and global circulation of human
influenza viruses to provide a sound basis for the biannual
WHO recommendations on the composition of influenza
vaccines for use in the Northern and Southern Hemispheres.
For countries in equatorial regions, epidemiological consid-
erations influence which recommendation (February or Sep-
tember) individual national and regional authorities
consider more appropriate.
Role of National Influenza Centres
National Influenza Centres (NICs) play a vital role in this
complex process. Their core activities include collating
epidemiological information, diagnosing cases of influenza A
and B infection, and identifying the subtype or lineage of
the viruses responsible. The primarily molecular diagnosis
of infection using RT-PCR techniques is based upon
standardized primers and probes provided by the GISRS.
Viruses must also be isolated to allow their antigenic identifi-
cation using the type- and subtype-specific reference reagents
provided in annually distributed WHO kits. Further detailed
characterization may include sequence analyses to monitor
genetic changes and assessment of virological traits such as
resistance to antiviral drugs. Sequence data are shared within
the GISRS using public databases such as GenBank and GI-
SAID EpiFlu. NICs in some settings then attempt to relate
potentially important virological changes observed with clin-
ical and epidemiological information and trends and may
even conduct serological studies to evaluate the immune sta-
tus of the population.
Weekly reports on the virological characteristics and epi-
demiology of circulating viruses are submitted to the WHO
FluNet – an internet-based data-query and reporting tool.
Information on the virus subtypes and lineages is collated,
together with observations of potential clinical or epidemi-
ological importance, and regular summaries of the geo-
graphical spread, intensity and impact of influenza are
produced by WHO.
If human infection with an avian or other animal influ-
enza virus is suspected, a suitably equipped NIC or other
national influenza reference laboratory can conduct preli-
minary diagnostic testing using RT-PCR protocols and ⁄or
reagents for H5, H7 and H9 subtypes provided by WHO.
Such RT-PCR testing does not require high-level biocon-
tainment facilities. However, it is expected that the detec-
tion of any unusual influenza A virus distinct from known
WHO writing group
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circulating viruses, especially one suspected to be of animal
origin or unsubtypable using current WHO reagents, will
immediately be reported to WHO and collaboration
urgently initiated with a WHO Collaborating Centre
(WHOCC). If the required laboratory biosafety facilities
and procedures are not available, then virus isolation
should not be attempted in the national laboratory and the
sample should be promptly sent to a WHOCC.
Role of WHO Collaborating Centres
The routine and timely sharing of representative circulating
influenza viruses and unusual viruses with a WHOCC is an
essential step in the vaccine virus selection process. The
criteria for forwarding viruses include their temporal,
geographical and age-group distribution, severity of cases
and virological characteristics such as unidentified subtype
and antiviral drug resistance. WHOCCs are then responsi-
ble for the systematic antigenic characterization of the
thousands of viruses forwarded each year by NICs and
other laboratories, and for the detailed genetic characteriza-
tion of a selected subset. Such detailed antigenic and
genetic characterization is a necessary step in monitoring
virus evolution and detecting any distinct antigenic variants
that may necessitate updating the seasonal vaccine compo-
sition. The process also allows for the identification and
characterization of animal viruses causing sporadic human
infections, assessment of the risk they pose and the poten-
tial development of candidate vaccine viruses as part of
pandemic preparedness.
Antigenic characterization
Of prime importance in immunity to influenza is the
production of antibodies to the virus haemagglutinin (HA)
protein. Such antibodies can neutralize the infectivity of
viruses, and their level in the blood has been shown to
correlate with the level of protection against infection with a
homologous virus. As a result, influenza vaccine virus selec-
tion has primarily been based upon the antigenic
characterization of virus HA using the haemagglutination
inhibition (HAI) assay. HAI tests provide a visual readout of
the ability of specific antibodies to prevent the attachment of
HA to red blood cells (RBCs) and thus prevent their aggluti-
nation. Antigenic drift in the HA of circulating viruses in
response to host immunity reduces the effectiveness of vac-
cines and is therefore the major consideration when recom-
mendations are made on the composition of influenza
vaccines.
The HAI test is likely to remain the assay of choice for the
antigenic characterization of virus HA for the foreseeable
future. Strain-specific antisera are produced by infecting
previously unexposed (‘naive’) ferrets with either vaccine
viruses, reference viruses representative of circulating viruses
or viruses that appear in HAI tests to be potential antigenic
variants. The resulting sets of reference viruses and antisera
are then used to evaluate the antigenic characteristics of the
HAs of recent isolates. Where antigenic differences are
detected, these are likely to affect human immunity against
the new variants. The HAI test is a surrogate for the more
complicated and time-consuming virus neutralization assay
used to clarify antigenic relationships when observed varia-
tions in HAI titre reflect, for example, changes in receptor
binding rather than differences in antigenicity.
Genetic characterization
A subset of between 10% and 20% of all viruses received is
selected for genetic sequencing and more detailed analysis
– principally of their HA and NA components. This subset
is selected to include representative circulating viruses, as
well as apparent antigenic variants and viruses from severe
or fatal cases. Phylogenetic analyses are carried out to
better understand the evolution of circulating viruses, their
degree of genetic heterogeneity and the emergence of new
genetic clades. Antigenic or other phenotypic variants may
thus be defined in terms of separate genetic clades with
distinct amino acid signatures. Relating the locations of
amino acid substitutions to antigenic, receptor-binding or
glycosylation sites on the 3D structure of the HA molecule
then helps to identify the individual substitutions associ-
ated with phenotypic (antigenic) changes. Identifying such
amino acid signatures also facilitates global monitoring of
the emergence, distribution and impact of different genetic
variants. This is particularly helpful when data on emergent
variants are limited at the time of a WHO vaccine
consultation. Comparisons of the sequences found in clini-
cal specimens and virus isolates are also useful in revealing
amino acid substitutions which result from passage in
different substrates, mainly MDCK cells and eggs. Up-to-
date sequence data are shared within GISRS and made
publically available via the GISAID EpiFlu database.
Complete genome sequencing is necessary to identify
animal (including avian) viruses causing human infection
and is important in detecting the emergence of reassortant
viruses among co-circulating human viruses or between
human and animal viruses. WHOCCs maintain panels of
reference reagents for all influenza A subtypes. These
include H5 (especially H5N1), H9 and H7 avian viruses
and various H1N1 and H3N2 swine viruses, as well as
viruses present in other animals such as horses and dogs.
Studies using human sera
WHOCCs also collaborate with the WHO ERLs in serologi-
cal studies of representative human sera from previously
vaccinated individuals. Sera are provided by vaccine manu-
facturers and are used in HAI tests to assess whether or
not the antibodies induced by current vaccines are likely to
be effective against currently circulating viruses. The results
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provide important supplementary evidence for vaccine
composition decisions.
WHO recommendations on influenza vaccine com-
position
The principal criteria used to decide whether or not to rec-
ommend changes to influenza vaccine components include:
• the emergence of an antigenically and genetically distinct
variant among circulating viruses (including a novel
influenza A virus with the potential to cause a pandemic);
• evidence of the geographical spread of such a distinct
variant and its association with outbreaks of disease,
indicating its future epidemiological significance;
• the reduced ability of existing vaccine-induced antibodies
to neutralize the emergent variant; and
• the availability of suitable candidate vaccine viruses.
To facilitate collaborative studies by the WHOCCs and
WHO ERLs and ensure that appropriate potential candi-
date vaccine viruses are identified in advance of the
WHO vaccine composition consultation, the most recent
virological and epidemiological data are shared and dis-
cussed via teleconferences held 6 and 2 weeks before the
WHO consultation. A summary of each teleconference is
promptly distributed to keep all NICs and vaccine manu-
facturers informed of the developing situation. In addi-
tion, potential candidate vaccine viruses are provided to
manufacturers.
During the formal biannual consultations, the technical
advisory group considers the cumulative antigenic and
genetic data on the viruses characterized by WHOCCs. The
data are set against the broader epidemiological context
collated by WHO and are supported by serological data
from WHOCCs and WHO ERLs, as well as by additional
information provided by NICs. HAI data obtained in the
different centres using a wide variety of reference viruses
and ferret antisera are correlated using common reference
reagents. In recent years, antigenic cartography has been
used to collate and statistically visualize the degree of
antigenic variation. The interpretation of HAI data may,
however, be complicated by the influence of changes in the
receptor-binding properties of natural viruses or by the
selection of variants during isolation and passaging in
different cell or egg substrates. Comparisons with sequence
data are made to relate any differences in antigenicity with
specific HA genetic clades and to more precisely define the
identity of antigenic variants. The results of virus neutral-
ization tests, which usually correspond to those of HAI
tests, are used to clarify the true antigenic relationships
between different viruses.
If the antigenic data, supported by genetic and serological
data, indicate that a new antigenic variant is spreading glob-
ally, then a change in that component of the seasonal vaccine
is considered to be warranted. The implementation of a rec-
ommendation to update a vaccine component is, however,
contingent upon the availability of suitable vaccine viruses.
Only after all the factors have been taken into account is a
decision taken on whether or not to recommend a change in
influenza vaccine virus composition. The decision is
announced at an Information Meeting immediately follow-
ing each WHO consultation and published on the WHO
web site and in the WHO Weekly Epidemiological Record.
Since the re-emergence of human cases of highly patho-
genic H5N1 avian influenza in 2003, WHO has also
regularly reviewed the available antigenic and genetic data
on human and avian viruses in relation to the epidemiol-
ogy of H5N1 influenza among birds. To support the devel-
opment of safe and effective human H5N1 vaccines, WHO
has coordinated the development of a number of candidate
attenuated vaccine viruses (Annex 1) and made them avail-
able to vaccine producers. Clinical trials have been con-
ducted to evaluate the immunogenicity of different H5N1
vaccine formulations and the breadth of antibody responses
elicited. In addition, as part of pandemic preparedness,
WHO has coordinated the ongoing development and
updating of an inventory of H2, H7 and H9 candidate
vaccine viruses.
Vaccine development considerations
Important constraints on the vaccine virus selection process
include the tight timelines involved (Annex 1), particularly
in the Northern Hemisphere, where since recent years
seasonal influenza activity tends to start increasing in
middle or late January in general. As a consequence, deci-
sions often have to be made relatively early in the influenza
season. In addition, post-infection ferret antisera against
potential antigenic variants are urgently required to define
their antigenic relationships to previously circulating
viruses. Panels of recent isolates must also be prepared to
assess the degree to which they are neutralized by antibod-
ies in the sera of previously vaccinated individuals. Finally,
potential new candidate vaccine viruses must be prepared
and evaluated for their suitability in vaccine production.
Ensuring the timely availability of viruses with suitable
growth properties is a crucial step in ensuring that suffi-
cient quantities of vaccine can be produced in time for
administration prior to the next influenza season. Although
cell culture has steadily replaced the use of embryonated
eggs for the primary isolation of viruses, candidate vaccine
viruses must still be isolated directly in eggs according to
current regulatory requirements. The limited availability of
egg isolates, particularly of recent H3N2 viruses which gen-
erally grow poorly in eggs, has led to the establishment of
Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRA-
DAs) and similar agreements between the vaccine industry
and a number of WHOCCs to increase the availability of
egg isolates for vaccine use.
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The GISRS vaccine virus selection process necessarily
involves a series of collaborative steps, including the selec-
tion of prototype antigenic variants and suitable vaccine
viruses, and the provision of standardizing reagents by the
WHO ERLs. The process thus impacts directly upon the
subsequent authorizing of vaccine composition by national
and regional regulatory authorities and upon the large-scale
production of vaccine by manufacturers. Mismatches have
occasionally occurred as a result of the emergence of variant
strains shortly after the recommendations have been made,
highlighting one of the unavoidable consequences of current
vaccine development and production constraints. Neverthe-
less, retrospective studies have shown that with very few
exceptions WHO vaccine virus recommendations have
closely matched the influenza viruses that have circulated
during the following influenza season. In addition, following
the out-of-season emergence of the pandemic A(H1N1)
2009 virus, this closely integrated system demonstrated its
unique ability to very rapidly orchestrate the development
and provision of appropriate (suitably attenuated) candidate
vaccine viruses for pandemic vaccine production.
Improving influenza surveillance and
representative virus sharing
Global influenza surveillance has always presented a major
challenge as it is a highly demanding public health need
with a significantly uneven distribution of surveillance
capacity worldwide. Since the outbreak of severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003, the re-emergence of
H5N1 infection in humans and the 2009 H1N1 pandemic,
it has become ever clearer that surveillance and the prompt
sharing of viruses and information are central to the broad
range of influenza preparedness and response activities.
Enhancing NIC surveillance capacity
Although the known impact and the awareness of seasonal
influenza vary in different parts of the world, the threat
posed by avian H5N1 viruses has galvanized influenza
surveillance efforts in all countries. Improving surveillance
and acquiring the capacity to detect and report unusual
cases of influenza are essential components of global
pandemic planning and are enshrined in the International
Health Regulations (2005). Successful efforts to increase the
capacity of NICs and other laboratories have been made,
and in a number of settings the development, revision and
adoption of guidelines on strengthened national, regional
and global surveillance and collaboration is under way.
Global influenza surveillance has also been strengthened
through expanded geographical coverage and the collection
of more data of better quality. For example, in Africa there
are now 25 influenza laboratories in 21 countries, including
12 recognized NICs, almost all of which have the capacity
to conduct RT-PCR diagnosis of influenza infection. In less
than two years, the percentage of African countries with an
NIC increased from 17% to 26% with the number of coun-
tries with no influenza laboratory markedly decreasing.
Global, regional and national training workshops, assess-
ments and donations have all led to significant increases in
trained personnel, equipment procurement and laboratory
capacity, resulting in the increasingly widespread use of
molecular techniques such as real-time RT-PCR
and genetic sequencing. Recent WHO capacity-building
activities have included BSL-3 training courses for NICs to
promote safe practices when working with highly patho-
genic influenza viruses, and courses on virus isolation, gene
sequencing and antiviral resistance detection. Increased
participation in both internal and external quality
assurance programmes such as the WHO external quality
assessment project (EQAP) has contributed to marked
improvements in laboratory proficiency.
These and other efforts enabled a more effective
response to the emergence of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic
in many countries. However, the pandemic also revealed
significant limitations in the analysis and integration of
epidemiological and virological surveillance data. In addi-
tion, few early seroprevalence surveys were conducted to
allow for the timely assessment of the extent and impact
of the pandemic. The pandemic also revealed significant
gaps in laboratory infrastructure and personnel, equip-
ment procurement and funding, particularly in develop-
ing countries. Improvements and training in areas such
as web-based integration and analyses of clinical, epide-
miological and virological data are being implemented
but care must be taken to ensure that such activities are not
conducted at the expense of detection, characterization
and virus-sharing activities in less well-resourced settings.
Identified research priorities in influenza surveillance and
response include evaluation of the temporal and geographi-
cal circulation of influenza viruses and of the burden of
influenza. In all settings, establishing a sound evidence base
will support the development or updating of national,
regional and global policies, plans and guidelines. This in
turn could lead to greater acceptance of the use of influ-
enza vaccines, particularly seasonal vaccines, and assist in
the development of vaccination policies.
Virus and information sharing
The primary requirement of NICs will remain the prompt
diagnosis of influenza infection and the timely sharing of clin-
ical specimens and virus isolates – especially those obtained
from unusual, severe or fatal cases – backed up by appropriate
epidemiological and clinical information. Procedures should
be in place to ensure that the increasingly predominant use of
molecular diagnostic techniques, particularly real-time RT-
PCR, does not adversely affect the timely isolation and for-
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warding of viruses. Improved communication between NICs
and WHOCCs on how best to facilitate prompt virus sharing,
including discussion of the constraints faced, could improve
coordination and avoid potential delays.
A more systematic approach to engaging NIC information
and expertise would also lead to significant benefits. Such an
approach is likely to be facilitated by a number of develop-
ments in the use of WHO web-based tools. For example,
NICs with enhanced capabilities currently strengthen the col-
laborative characterization of viruses and aid early assess-
ment of the significance of genetic and antigenic changes by
sharing detailed virological information (especially HA
sequences) on selected viruses, either directly or via public
databases. As technologies advance, national patterns of sero-
positivity to circulating influenza viruses may also become
available on a more timely basis and could thus guide vaccine
use. This is particularly important given the increasing
emphasis now placed on assessing vaccine effectiveness.
Comprehensive NIC summary reports forwarded just prior
to each WHO consultation also provide highly beneficial
additional data to inform WHO recommendations on vac-
cine composition.
To overcome logistical and other obstacles to the safe
and efficient shipping of clinical specimens and virus iso-
lates to WHOCCs, a WHO Shipment Fund Project was
established. The project provides support to NICs and
other influenza laboratories in all countries by arranging
the transport of specimens and isolates along a guaranteed
cold chain, especially in settings where there are severe
financial and infrastructural constraints. As a direct result
of the project, and associated ‘infectious substances
shipping’ workshops conducted in all WHO regions, there
has been a significant increase in the number of countries
sharing specimens and isolates, especially following the
outbreak of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. Furthermore, the
expansion and harmonization of the information currently
provided in the accompanying standard shipping form to
include information such as clinical outcome, patient vacci-
nation status or recent travel history would greatly enhance
understanding of the epidemiological context associated
with the spread of viruses.
Animal viruses
A better understanding of the diversity and evolution of ani-
mal influenza viruses is essential for evaluating the pandemic
risk posed by subtypes currently causing sporadic human
infections (such as H5N1 and H9N2) and informing the
selection of candidate vaccine viruses. The emergence of
H5N1 in particular led to the establishment in 2005 of the
OIE–FAO Network of Expertise on Animal Influenza (OF-
FLU) – a worldwide network of approximately 20 laborato-
ries and institutions that coordinates the global surveillance
of animal influenza. A number of joint WHO-OFFLU tech-
nical initiatives on influenza at the human–animal interface
have been conducted (including successful collaboration
during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic) and reciprocal participa-
tion in annual meetings has taken place. There remains,
however, considerable scope for improved coordination and
collaboration with the animal influenza surveillance sector,
especially in the collection and analysis of antigenic and
genetic data, the timely exchange of representative viruses
and reference reagents, and the conducting of serological
studies of human exposure to zoonotic infection.
Influenza is an important disease of many avian and
mammalian species with serious economic consequences
for livestock industries and has potential adverse impacts
on human food supplies. Despite this, animal influenza
surveillance coverage is limited with a shortage of epidemi-
ological data on the circulation of various viruses in differ-
ent countries. Efforts are now under way to establish
triggers for initiating enhanced surveillance that go beyond
animal disease notification and sporadic human infections.
Although there is increasing understanding of the interrela-
tionships between animal and human influenza and the
need for ‘integrated’ surveillance, full collaboration at both
national and global levels is currently constrained by a
number of practical, funding, regulatory and policy issues.
Maintaining a regular dialogue based upon the mutual
interests of the different networks will be an important
public health activity and may also help to enhance the
sustainability of animal influenza surveillance in particular
settings. A more formal collaborative mechanism might
allow for the improved integration of animal virus data
into the WHO candidate vaccine virus selection process.
Increased awareness of the content and extent of use of
animal influenza vaccines would also aid understanding of
their impact on virus evolution.
Improving the process of vaccine virus
selection
A range of laboratory assays and other techniques provide
the complementary information on changes in the
antigenic and genetic characteristics of influenza viruses
needed to select the most appropriate influenza vaccine
viruses. However, inherent limitations in the biological
assays used and significant variations in the results
obtained by different laboratories complicate the collation
and definitive interpretation of data.
Assays for characterization of antigenic properties
and antibody responses
Because the HAI test outlined previously is a simple, rapid
and reproducible surrogate assay for virus neutralization, it
is widely used to measure the antigenic relationships
between different viruses as well as antibody responses to
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infection or vaccination. In addition, the test provides the
basis of the only current quantitative correlate of protection
against infection (serum HAI antibody titre ‡40) used to
standardize inactivated vaccines. However, variations in the
physical characteristics of RBCs obtained from different
species and differences in the receptor-binding properties of
different viruses influence both the sensitivity and the util-
ity of the assay. Furthermore, changes in receptor-binding
affinity or specificity associated with adaptation, antigenic
drift or the isolation and passage of viruses in eggs and cell
culture may also affect HAI titres. Standardization between
laboratories has also proved difficult, and the assay is cur-
rently not suitable for use in a fully automated system.
A range of practical refinements such as attempts to
develop ‘synthetic’ RBCs (for example using glycan-coated
beads) have been unsuccessful. Given the currently limited
knowledge of the principal natural receptors for influenza
viruses, such approaches are unlikely to circumvent the
virus-dependent shortcomings of assays based upon natural
RBCs which are therefore likely to remain the primary
approach to antigenic characterization for the foreseeable
future. Recent developments based on the use of panels of
recombinant HA do offer alternative or supplementary
microtitre or microarray binding-assay formats for
assessing antibody specificity and antibody inhibition of the
HA-glycan receptor interaction. Although such approaches
are relatively expensive and require a high degree of skill to
implement, they are potentially highly suited to automation
and in time may reduce the need for virus isolates. In
addition, such formats can readily be adapted to incorpo-
rate biosensor technologies to provide more quantitative
analyses of binding characteristics. A number of such assays
are currently being validated using ferret and human
antisera.
The contribution of antibodies against virus NA in
conferring protection following natural infection or vacci-
nation is still not well understood. Studies of NA antigenic
variation have been limited, and the NA content of influ-
enza vaccines is not currently standardized. Although neur-
aminidase inhibition (NAI) assays were conducted more
routinely in the past, these were cumbersome to perform
and were complicated by the relatively low levels of
antibodies against NA in post-infection ferret sera and by
interference from antibodies against HA. A number of
different NAI microtitre assay formats have recently been
developed. These have been used to correlate antigenic
changes with sequence variations in the NA component,
provide more precise information on the evolution of NA
and assess NA antibody responses following vaccination.
Improved understanding of antigenic drift in NA and of
the role of anti-NA antibodies in conferring immunity
might have significant implications for both vaccine virus
selection and vaccine development.
Microneutralization (MN) assays – based on measuring
virus replication, cell viability or NA activity – provide an
important adjunct to HAI tests in antigenic characteriza-
tion. MN assays are generally more sensitive and measure a
broader repertoire of functional antibodies that neutralize
viral replication, with potential advantages in the evalua-
tion of human serological responses. In addition, compari-
sons of MN and HAI tests for measuring antibody
responses in vaccinated individuals have shown a consistent
degree of correlation and have confirmed the utility of MN
assays in analyses of human antibody responses to H3
vaccine components. Techniques for simplifying assay for-
mats and making them more readily applicable to the
routine testing of low-titre viruses are under investigation,
and efforts are under way to use MN assays for H1 and B
viruses. This should facilitate the use of MN assays to over-
come the variable nature of interactions between viruses
and RBCs, and hence in interpreting ‘anomalous’ HAI
results which complicate vaccine virus selection. Pseudo-
type virus neutralization assays may also offer some advan-
tages in scale and standardization over conventional MN
assays for measuring serological responses to particular
viruses, especially highly pathogenic viruses. Furthermore,
ongoing improvements in automation will potentially
enable the more labour-intensive MN assay to be applied
to large-scale serological analysis. Epitope mapping using
genome fragment phage display libraries provides another
powerful technique for further dissecting the fine specificity
of antibody responses to vaccination and infection and
should allow for a better assessment of the quality of a
‘protective’ immune response and aid the development of
additional correlates of immunity.
Serological studies
To encourage the performance of seroepidemiological
surveys to assess the impact of influenza in a population,
countries should be supported in establishing well-charac-
terized serum banks of age-stratified representative sera as
a national, regional and global resource. Current advanta-
ges of the GISRS serological activities undertaken in sup-
port of vaccine virus selection include the use of shared
serum panels and common antigens, with frequent consen-
sus obtained from participating WHOCCs and WHO ERLs.
Limitations include the large variability of HAI data, a
requirement for antibody standards and a need for MN or
other assays to resolve inconsistencies. The availability of
antibody standards would not only enhance the compara-
bility of serological data generated in different laboratories
and countries but also facilitate the comparison of antibody
responses to different vaccines.
Increasing attention to influenza vaccine effectiveness
studies will lead to the availability of more real-time data
for comparing clinical benefit with the degree of antigenic
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relatedness of vaccine and circulating viruses. Such studies,
especially those based upon laboratory-confirmed
outcomes, should provide evidence of the specific benefits
of vaccination. Consistent studies providing estimates of
vaccine efficacy over successive influenza seasons should
improve understanding of the effects of small rather than
major antigenic differences between vaccine and circulating
viruses on clinical outcomes and should help to allay con-
cerns arising from a perceived vaccine mismatch caused by
the emergence of virus clades exhibiting little or no
antigenic drift.
Technological developments
Recent advances in high-throughput genetic sequencing
could potentially lead to a greatly enhanced understanding
of the genetic changes occurring in influenza viruses
and the evolutionary interactions that occur between
co-circulating viruses. In-depth analyses of the precise
mechanisms involved in the evolution and epidemiology of
influenza would require advanced bioinformatics tools to
comprehensively mine the data produced. Such an
approach should reveal, for example, the broader genetic
changes that underlie antigenic variation in HA and thus
allow for a better understanding of the relationship
between genetic evolution and antigenic drift. Increased
information from X-ray crystallography on the structural
features of the HAs of recent viruses and specific mutants,
together with developments in computer modelling, should
assist in attempts to predict the likely influence of amino
acid substitutions on the antigenic and receptor-binding
properties of new variants. Further development of
high-throughput laboratory systems for integrated and
automated genetic and phenotypic analyses – from initial
sample accession to data management – offers the intrigu-
ing prospect of a futuristic standardized virtual network for
virus characterization in an epidemiological context. As
such systems will have broad implications, not only for
vaccine virus selection, but also for the organization and
conduct of global influenza surveillance, it is extremely
important that their development and deployment are
integrated with the activities of the WHO GISRS.
Mathematical modelling
Numerous mathematical modelling techniques have now
been used to gain insights into the mechanisms that under-
lie both the evolution and the epidemiology of influenza
viruses. For example, exploratory models have been devel-
oped to generate and test various hypotheses to explain the
relatively restricted diversity of influenza viruses in terms
of constrained antigenic repertoire, and to explore the
underlying nature of immunity. They have also been used
to improve understanding of the extent of between-subtype
and between-type competition and of the potential conse-
quences of such interactions for trends in the incidence of
seasonal influenza viruses.
Phylogenetic models have also been used to identify
changes in selective constraints in relation to antigenic drift
and inter-species transmission. When based upon the
amino acid substitutions associated with mammalian host
adaptation, such models may aid assessment of the
pandemic potential of avian and other animal viruses.
Phylodynamic modelling based upon available sequence
data, supplemented with antigenic data, has already been
successfully used to trace the emergence of new antigenic
and genetic variants and track their geographical spread.
However, in the absence of greatly improved under-
standing of the underlying evolutionary and biological
mechanisms and other processes involved, the capacity of
current mathematical modelling techniques to predict the
timing and nature of future antigenic and genetic changes
is limited. The intrinsically stochastic nature of influenza
evolution may make such predictive modelling extremely
challenging. Where changes occur over short time scales,
the application of simpler non-mechanistic statistical
algorithms, such as those used as the basis of antigenic
cartography, is likely to be more useful in facilitating vac-
cine virus selection than attempts to develop predictive
models from the existing complex dynamical models of
influenza evolution and transmission. Such predictive mod-
els might presently be better suited for use in understand-
ing the possible long-term effects of vaccination, optimizing
the timing and location of focused surveillance efforts and
predicting the possible consequences of the emergence of a
novel virus. Eventually, these models should be able to take
advantage of integrated immunological and antigenic sur-
veillance data to develop predictions of short-term dynam-
ics in specific locations.
Impact of new vaccine technologies
All new influenza vaccine technologies have implications
for vaccine virus selection and for regulatory and manufac-
turing processes. However, any potential requirement to
tailor the virus selection process to specific types of vaccine
is unlikely to be a crucial issue, especially if advances in
vaccine technology and speed of production lead to greater
flexibility in the timing of recommendations. Although
live-attenuated vaccines are not yet universally licensed, the
current vaccine composition recommendation process is
used. However, antibody response is not a good correlate
of protection for such vaccines and the identification of a
true correlate might affect the requirement for annual
updating. Several quadrivalent vaccines are also now under
development that contain representative strains of the two
influenza B virus lineages (B ⁄Victoria and B ⁄Yamagata)
together with influenza A(H1N1) and A(H3N2) viruses.
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This raises a number of issues that could affect vaccine
supply, including the possibility of two poorly growing vac-
cine viruses; the likely variable impact of a fourth compo-
nent on vaccine yields and timing of manufacture; the
prioritization of influenza B lineage viruses in the context
of both trivalent and quadrivalent vaccine production; and
the need for a fourth set of reagents. Adjuvanted vaccines
have been licensed with the primary aims of inducing
better immune responses in certain age groups and allow-
ing ‘antigen sparing’. Although there has been no specific
intention to provide a broader spectrum of immunity to
circumvent the need for annual vaccine updates, different
products are likely to show a different breadth of response.
Providing recommendations in relation to product-specific
cross-reactivity over successive influenza seasons is unlikely
to be a feasible option for the WHO GISRS. In addition,
various types of recombinant vaccines are now under
development, including protein subunit, DNA, vector and
VLP vaccines – none of which are presently licensed.
In the case of non-HA-based vaccines, different guide-
lines will apply and all such vaccines are likely to impact
the current vaccine virus selection process in various ways
depending upon their precise type and mechanism of pro-
tection. The level of protection afforded by immunity to
NA is receiving continued interest. Currently, this compo-
nent is included as part of the candidate vaccine virus and
is selected on the basis of its sequence but not antigenicity.
Standardization of the NA component would require
antigenic characterization during the virus selection
process, while antigenic changes in NA in the absence of a
corresponding change in HA antigenicity may on its own
necessitate the updating of vaccine composition. For all
such vaccines, HA variant selection may become less crucial
than it is for current vaccines.
Although high-growth reassortants have been used to
manufacture influenza A vaccine components for many
years, their yields have been variable and there is continued
need to identify the molecular determinants of high yield
to engineer a more reliable and reproducible production
process. Reverse genetics, now used in the United States to
produce virus reassortants for live-attenuated vaccines, has
also been used to produce attenuated candidate H5N1
vaccine viruses suitable for inactivated vaccine manufac-
ture. This approach was, however, less successful than
classical reassortment in obtaining a suitable 2009 H1N1
pandemic vaccine virus, emphasizing the need for further
investigation of the applicability of reverse genetics in the
routine provision of suitable vaccine viruses.
Following the licensing of cell culture vaccines, the feasi-
bility of isolating seasonal vaccine viruses in qualified1 cell
lines is being evaluated in a collaboration involving a
number of WHOCCs and WHO ERLs under CRADAs with
vaccine manufacturers. These studies should provide the
basis for the introduction of a universal qualified cell cul-
ture system for providing mammalian cell-derived seasonal
influenza candidate vaccine viruses. This would result in a
greater choice of candidates, especially for recent H3N2
viruses, and may provide greater flexibility in responding
to the ‘late’ emergence of a variant necessitating a vaccine
composition change. Such virus isolates would not be sub-
ject to undesirable egg-selected changes and would poten-
tially provide a better match to the natural virus. However,
the relative merits of egg and cell culture candidate vaccine
viruses have still to be rigorously evaluated. Guidance on
quality assurance aspects has already been published by the
European Medicines Agency (EMA). The finalization of
new EMA regulatory guidelines may be accompanied by a
WHO technical document on harmonizing regulatory
approaches worldwide and the engagement of other regula-
tory authorities in vaccine-manufacturing nations.
Vaccine manufacturers and the WHO ERLs are also col-
laborating in an evaluation of cell culture-based reagents
for use in single radial immunodiffusion (SRID) potency
testing, due for completion in early 2011. In addition,
despite international consensus on the key quality specifica-
tions for 2009 H1N1 pandemic influenza vaccines, reagents
to calibrate the majority of candidate vaccines using con-
ventional potency tests only became available immediately
prior to the initiation of clinical trials. In some cases,
candidate vaccines were available ahead of the reagents.
Although national authorities proved flexible in accepting
the use of validated alternative potency tests to allow
clinical trials to proceed, newer methods such as high-per-
formance liquid chromatography (HPLC) and mass spec-
trometry are now being evaluated.
Conclusions and future perspective
The GISRS has a long history of success in recommending
influenza vaccine compositions that have closely matched
the combination of viruses circulating during subsequent
influenza seasons. Based upon the voluntary participation
of its many constituent partners, the GISRS enjoys strong
institutional and governmental support.
Global influenza surveillance is the foundation of the
vaccine virus selection process. Efforts to enhance and
strengthen national, regional and global laboratory capac-
ity for virological surveillance and representative virus
sharing must continue. As part of this, improved integra-
tion of virological and disease surveillance data will be a
key aim and will help to build the foundations for
future studies of the impact and burden of influenza
worldwide.
1 Defined as cell lines accepted by regulatory authorities as suitable
substrates for vaccine manufacture.
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To strengthen the pandemic influenza preparedness,
collaboration between the GISRS and veterinary laborato-
ries and organizations such as OFFLU in relation to zoo-
notic influenza infection has been greatly enhanced and has
included the development of appropriate candidate human
vaccine viruses from animal viruses. However, there
remains considerable scope for improvement in this area,
including the more timely exchange of information, viruses
and reagents, and strengthened technical collaboration at all
levels.
Although antigenic characterization of promptly
forwarded virus isolates will remain the central criterion
for selecting influenza vaccine viruses in the foreseeable
future, technological developments (such as advanced
recombinant DNA and protein technologies, and high-
throughput sequencing and advanced bio-informatics tools)
will inevitably impact current GISRS surveillance and virus
selection activities. In the interests of global public health,
it will be important to integrate into the GISRS system
appropriate information and data generated by various
networks using emerging technologies.
Antigenic cartography has been adopted by the GISRS in
recent years as a means of integrating HAI data from dif-
ferent laboratories to allow for statistical comparison and
visual display. The development of new statistical
algorithms to complement the use of antigenic cartography
may further facilitate vaccine virus selection.
Greater emphasis should be placed on conducting
human serological studies which incorporate the use of
antibody standards to improve the comparability of results.
Such studies would improve current understanding of the
prevalence and spread of influenza, and complement the
development of improved epidemiological models. Greater
collaborative effort is needed to generate randomly
sampled, representative and integrated serological, epidemi-
ological and evolutionary data that provide snapshots of
host and viral populations suitable for modelling hypothe-
ses on virus evolution and host immunity. The application
of advanced techniques for dissecting the fine specificity of
antibody responses to vaccination and infection should also
lead to improvements in understanding the quality of a
‘protective’ immune response and aid in the development
of additional correlates of immunity.
Recent collaboration between the GISRS and external
partners including academic institutions and vaccine man-
ufacturers has resulted in the increased availability of egg
isolates and high-growth reassortants. New approaches to
the generation of high-growth vaccine viruses involving
the use of reverse genetics and qualified cell cultures will
continue to be evaluated and developed, as will alternative
methods of vaccine potency testing. WHO will continue
to support these and other efforts to increase the reliabil-
ity and timeliness of global influenza vaccine supply.
New vaccine types currently under development may
allow more flexibility in the timing of recommendations
on vaccine virus composition. Conversely, alterations to
the virus selection process and additional information
may be needed in relation to new-generation vaccine
types with different compositions and mechanisms of
protection.
The WHO GISRS vaccine virus selection process lies at
the heart of global efforts to address the constantly evolving
threat posed by influenza. For decades, this highly collabo-
rative and complex process has ensured a continued supply
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of effective seasonal vaccines and was able to respond very
rapidly to the emergence of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. If
the current limitations and constraints inherent in the
process are to be overcome, ongoing efforts by the WHO
GISRS and its partners must continue to identify improve-
ments, harness new technologies and strengthen collabora-
tion. WHO will continue in its central role of developing
and coordinating worldwide expertise to meet the increas-
ing public health need for influenza vaccines and will
support this process through the convening of periodic
international consultations on improving influenza vaccine
virus selection.
Annex 1: Process of influenza vaccine
virus selection and development2
The diagram shows that the individual steps in the selec-
tion of candidate vaccine viruses and development of
standardizing reagents for seasonal influenza and for a
potential H5N1 influenza pandemic are essentially equiva-
lent. For seasonal vaccines the timelines are:
• Steps 1–4: the collection, isolation and thorough anti-
genic and genetic characterization of recent virus isolates
continues throughout the year;
• Step 4a: comparisons of the recognition of representative
recent viruses by vaccine-induced antibodies in human
sera are conducted 2–3 weeks before the biannual WHO
vaccine consultation meetings;
• Steps 5, 6a and 7a: candidate viruses for vaccine use are
reviewed and selected, and high-growth reassortants
prepared and characterized following identification of
(potential) antigenic variants – these steps are not solely
dictated by the recommendations of the WHO biannual
vaccine virus consultations.
• Step 8: Evaluation of their growth properties is
conducted in a timely manner around the time of the
WHO vaccine virus consultations and prior to authoriza-
tion of vaccine composition by national authorities.
• Step 9a: Preparation of the standardizing reagents for new
vaccine components is initiated once the particular vaccine
virus has been selected following the WHO recommendation.
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